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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. OBSCENITY STATUTE DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD
In Vernon Beigay, Inc. v. Traxler1 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals held portions of the South Carolina obscenity statute
unconstitutionally overbroad. The unconstitutional sections al-
lowed the prosecutor to introduce evidence of "the character of
the audience for which the material was designed or to which it
was directed ' 2 and of what "the predominant appeal of the ma-
terial would be for ordinary adults or a special audience and
what effect, if any, it would probably have on the behavior of
such people"3 in prosecutions for dissemination of obscene
materials.
Beigay is inconsistent with Miller v. California,4 Hamling v.
United States,5 and Mishkin v. New York,8 each of which allows
the trier of fact to consider the prurient appeal to specific devi-
ant or perverted groups when determining the obscenity of ma-
terial directed to that group. The Beigay court, however, cor-
rectly struck the statute, presumably because of its potentially
broad application to material not directed to deviant groups and
because the language of the two sections does not comport with
particularity to the narrow holdings of Hamling and Mishkin.
An officer of the Greenville County Sheriff's Department in-
formed Beigay of complaints that several video stores in the area
1. 790 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1986).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-280(1)- (Law. Co-op. 1985).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-280(4) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
4. 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973)("[S]o far as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it
will be judged by its impact upon an average person, rather than a particularly suscepti-
ble or sensitive person-or indeed a totally insensitive one.").
5. 418 U.S. 87, 129 (1974) (upholding a jury instruction which allowed the jury to
measure the brochure by its appeal to the prurient interest not only of the average per-
son but also of a clearly defined sexual group).
6. 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966) ("Where the material is designed for and primarily dis-
seminated to a clearly defined sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-
appeal requirement. . . is satisfied if the dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group.").
1
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were distributing obscene tapes.7 After viewing some of the
tapes, the sheriff concluded that the complaints were legitimate.
The officer advised Beigay that the distribution of obscene
materials was unlawful and requested that he discontinue the
activity or bear the risk of prosecution.8
Beigay sued in the District Court of South Carolina, seeking
monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 and injunctive relief
restraining enforcement of the statute. The plaintiff alleged that
the statute was void for vagueness and was unconstitutionally
overbroad. 1° Judge Wilkins denied the plaintiff's constitutional
challenge and request for monetary relief in a summary judg-
ment ruling. Beigay appealed the order. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in part, but reversed on
the issue of overbreadth. The defendants filed a petition for
rehearing."1
The court held that the statute failed to conform with each
of the three prongs of the Miller test.12 The three guidelines for
determining whether the material is obscene are as follows:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.13
Relying on Roth v. United States,1 4 the court reasoned that
the statute allowed the trier of fact to ignore the Miller stan-
dards of prurient appeal to the average person. The court found
that the statute improperly allowed the trier of fact to consider
the character of the audience or the predominant appeal to a
select group, and the resulting behavioral effects on them. The
7. 790 F.2d at 1090.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
10. 790 F.2d at 1090.
11. Defendants' petition for rehearing was filed May 9, 1986.
12. 790 F.2d at 1094.
13. 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
14. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth is a pre-Miller decision holding that the obscenity
may not be tested by its impact upon most susceptible persons. Id. at 488-89.
[Vol. 39
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court also concluded that the statute allowed the trier of fact to
consider only portions of the work and to ignore its scientific,
artistic, political or social value. 15
The court correctly stated that these sections, considered
alone, do not specifically comply with Miller. The section in con-
troversy, section 16-15-280, addresses specific sorts of evidence
that "shall be admissible" in a "prosecution for an offense in-
volving dissemination of obscenity."1" This section, however,
cannot be interpreted fully without reference to section 16-15-
260 which defines obscenity and which clearly tracks the sug-
gested language of Miller.17 Subsections one and four of section
16-15-280 do not purport to replace the standards defined in
section 16-15-260. Instead, these subsections only permit admis-
sion of evidence to provide some factual data upon which the
trier of fact may make his determination according to Miller
standards.
In citing Roth for the proposition that the trier of fact may
not consider the impact upon a specified group of people,18
the court ignored two important considerations. First, Roth
held that material may not be determined to be obscene by ref-
erence to its appeal or effect upon the most susceptible person. 19
15. The court illustrated this point by using a hypothetical situation: A medical
anatomy textbook, if used other than for its intended purpose, may have a prurient ap-
peal to certain people. If the use of this book resulted in morbid sexual behavior, or lewd
and lascivious desires, the trier of fact could find the material obscene. 790 F.2d at 1094-
95 n.12.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-280 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-260 (Law. Co-op. 1985) provides in part as follows:
(a) "Obscene or obscenity" means any work, material or performance
which, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex, which portrays
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, does
not have serious literary, artistic, political, educational or scientific value. In
order for any matter to be determined "obscene" the trier of fact must find:
(1) that the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the matter taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, and
(2) that the matter depicts, or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by this Section or authoritatively
construed by the courts of this State as being a portrayal of patently
offensive sexual conduct as the phrase is used in the definition of ob-
scene, and
(3) that the matter taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, educational, or scientific value.
18. 790 F.2d at 1094 n.10.
19. 354 U.S. at 488-89.
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Subsections one and four of section 16-15-280 do not purport to
allow this effect. Subsection one allows admission of evidence of
the character of the audience to which the material is directed.
This type of person can hardly be equated with the most suscep-
tible person.20 Subsection four allows evidence of the predomi-
nant appeal to ordinary adults or to a special audience if any. A
more appropriate criticism of subsection four is that it allows
the trier of fact to consider evidence of the probable effect on
the behavior of these people. Not only is this evidence conjec-
tural, but also the question of prurience involves appeal to the
viewer, not the behavior of persons once exposed to the material.
The second consideration ignored by the Fourth Circuit in
Beigay is that Miller21 expressly modified Roth. Miller specifi-
cally excepted from its "average person" standard material that
is directed to a well-defined perverted or sexually deviant
group.2 Hamling" restated and elaborated upon the Miller
holding. Possibly the only method to show the prurient appeal
of material directed to a sexually deviant group is to introduce
evidence of the character of the group. This exception to the
Roth standard is justified because such material may have no
prurient appeal to the average person, but may appeal, nonethe-
less, to the prurient interests of the group targeted by the
material.
The Beigay court could have limited the application of
these two subsections to cases dealing with material directed to
a sexually deviant or perverted group.24 Although both the
plaintiff and the defendants addressed the possibility of limiting
the statute's application,25 the court, without elaboration, ap-
plied the overbreadth doctrine. Courts are more likely to strike a
statute using the overbreadth doctrine when the statute is cen-
20. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966) ("[S]ince our holding re-
quires that the recipient group be defined with more specificity than in terms of sexually
immature persons, it also avoids the inadequacy of the most-susceptible-person facet of
the Hicklin test."). Roth overruled the Hicklin test. 353 U.S. at 488-89.
21. 413 U.S. at 36-37.
22. Id. at 33.
23. 418 U.S. at 129.
24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) ("Facial overbreadth has not
been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute.").
25. See Opening Brief of Appellant; Opening Brief of Appellees.
[Vol. 39
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sorial in nature.28
While the result may be correct, it is unclear how the court
reached its decision. The lack of explanation will make redraft-
ing the statute difficult. How the court would react to legislation
aimed specifically at material directed to sexually deviant groups
is also unclear since the court did not address the issue in its
opinion.
Beigay leaves South Carolina practitioners without statu-
tory authority to justify admission of evidence showing the pru-
rient appeal of sexually deviant materials. Often proof of the
prurient appeal of these materials can be established only by ev-
idence of the character of the group and of the prurient appeal
to that group, since it has no such appeal to the average person.
Practitioners must resort to Hamling and Mishkin for authority
to admit this type of evidence. Should the legislature propose
new legislation to provide for the admission of this evidence, the
statute should limit admissibility of the evidence to cases involv-
ing clearly defined sexually deviant or perverted groups in strict
compliance with Mishkin and Hamling.
Elizabeth T. Thomas
II. GENDER-BASED STATUTE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In In re Estate of Mercer 7 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a statute designed to prevent married men from
substantially disinheriting their wives or legitimate children was
unconstitutional. The statute, section 21-7-480 of the South Car-
olina Code, prohibited married males from leaving more than
one-fourth of their estates to their paramours or children born
to them out of wedlock." The court based its decision on the
26. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844,
920-21 (1970). The overbreadth doctrine is applied to statutes censoring first amendment
activity because of its chilling effect on that activity. Id. at 853. The South Carolina
definition itself is not unconstitutional; the provisions struck by the court in Beigay re-
lated only to evidentiary matters and arguably did not have a chilling effect on Beigay's
activity.
27. 288 S.C. 313, 342 S.E.2d 591 (1986).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-480 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides as follows:
If any person who is an inhabitant of this State or who has any estate
therein shall beget any bastard child or shall live in adultery with a woman,
such person having a wife or lawful children of his own living, and shall give,
by legacy or devise, for the use and benefit of the woman with whom he lives in
1987]
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equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.2 9
Mercer arose on a complex set of facts spanning five years.
Clarence Mercer married Lavonia Perry (Perry) in October 1977.
They separated after a month, and Mercer, with Perry's ap-
proval and assistance, obtained a Haitian divorce in February
1978. In May 1979, Mercer married Carol Saxon (Saxon). Soon
thereafter, Mercer and Saxon exe cuted a joint will, each leaving
their entire estate to the other. A residuary clause provided that
at the survivor's death the estate would be divided equally
among Mercer's daughter and Saxon's three children. After Mer-
cer died in August 1982, his daughter, Linda Taylor, and Perry
contested the will.30 The probate court found Mercer's Haitian
divorce invalid,31 making his second marriage bigamous and
void. Consequently, Saxon was reduced to the status of a par-
amour and section 21-7-480 limited her share of the estate. The
circuit court affirmed the probate court's ruling, and the execu-
trix of Mercer's estate appealed to the South Carolina Supreme
Court.
On appeal the supreme court focused on three issues:32 the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the validity of
Mercer's second marriage,33 the constitutionality of section 21-7-
480, and the propriety of awarding Mercer's estate to his daugh-
ter, Linda Taylor. 4
adultery or of his bastard child or children, any larger or greater proportion of
the real clear value of his estate, real or personal, after paying his debts than
one-fourth part thereof, such legacy or devise shall be null and void for so
much of the amount or value thereof as shall or may exceed such fourth part of
his real and personal estate.
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
30. Taylor contested Mercer's will because Mercer named her as the sole beneficiary
under a previous will executed prior to Mercer's first marriage. Perry asserted that she
was entitled to a dower right because Mercer died before May 22, 1984, the date that
dower rights ended in South Carolina. See Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401
(1984).
31. The divorce was invalid because Mercer was a resident of South Carolina, not
Haiti, at the time of his divorce. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-420 to -430 (Law. Co-op.
1985).
32. Brief of Petitioner at 1; Brief of Respondent at 1.
33. The supreme court summarily affirmed the circuit court's ruling on the first is-
sue, finding that "[t]he probate court had the collateral authority to determine the valid-
ity of the divorce since that was a necessary step in determining the true heirs of the
estate." 288 S.C. at 315, 342 S.E.2d at 592.
34. Because the other three residuary legatees were Saxon's children by a previous
marriage, they were not covered by § 21-7-480 and, arguably, were entitled to share in
[Vol. 39
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In addressing the pivotal issue of equal protection, the court
applied the standard equal protection analysis, stating that
"[c]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives. '35 Since no important governmental objec-
tives were "suggested ' 6 and the court "discern[ed] none, 37 the
court struck down the statute, making it unnecessary to address
the intestacy issue.
Aside from the immediate practical result that married men
may now freely devise their property, this decision has several
interesting implications for practitioners faced with equal pro-
tection litigation. On its face, Mercer is inconsistent with War-
dIaw v. Peck,35 which upheld a statute making it actionable per
se to impute unchastity to a woman. Indeed, the respondents in
Mercer cited Wardlaw in urging the court to hold that the stat-
ute was applicable to both sexes.39 The distinction between the
two cases, however, is significant. In Wardlaw the court upheld
the statute because the common law arguably provides men with
the same protection women receive under the statute. In Mercer,
however, the statute treated men and women differently because
property is freely devisable by either sex at common law. Attor-
neys arguing equal protection cases may benefit, therefore, by
exploring and contrasting the common law with the statute in
question.
Moreover, the conclusory method that the court used in de-
termining that the statute was gender-based raises an interest-
ing question. The court placed great emphasis on the use of
male pronouns in section 21-7-480 in summarily rejecting the
idea that the statute treated men and women similarly. The
Mercer pronoun analysis, taken to an extreme, raises the possi-
bility that many other South Carolina statutes that obviously
apply to both sexes, but which are replete with male pronouns, 0
could fall prey to equal protection arguments.
The importance which the Mercer court attached to the his-
the estate.
35. 288 S.C. at 316, 342 S.E.2d at 592.
36. Id. at 317, 342 S.E.2d at 593.
37. Id.
38. 282 S.C. 199, 318 S.E.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1984).
39. Brief of Respondent at 9.
40. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-26-20(e)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
1987]
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tory surrounding the statute's enactment, however, should signal
that the court's holding does not extend to all gender-referenced
statutes. More modern statutes using male pronouns, for exam-
ple, were not passed at a time when great cultural and legal dis-
tinctions were made between the sexes. Consequently, the court
is more likely to view the legislature's use of male pronouns as
incidental rather than intentional.
Mercer should alert practioners to the opportunities and
hazards in raising equal protection challenges to gender-refer-
enced statutes. More importantly, Mercer, particularly when
contrasted with Wardlaw, illustrates the value of exploring and
contrasting the common law with the statute in question.
S. Lester Tate III
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